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In this paper, the firms within two pairs of complementors decide whether to merge and
eventually bundle their products. Depending on the competitive pressure in the market, ei-
ther the firms within both pairs merge, with or without bundling, or only one pair merges
and bundles, whereas the other one remains independent. The latter case can be harmful
for consumers as overall prices surge. We also consider the case where a pair moves before
the other. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where the first movers merge, but re-
frain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent antitrust decisions about proposed mergers
explicitly considered the possibility that the merging
parties engage in bundling, especially when they pro-
duce complementary goods. This point is extremely
delicate. On one hand, based on the seminal contribu-
tion by Cournot (1838), nonhorizontal agreements
involving complements tend to reduce prices, by which
one could argue that a merger between suppliers of
complementary products should be allowed for. On
the other hand, since Whinston (1990), bundling has
been deemed as welfare reducing, especially when
achieving foreclosure. As a consequence, a merger that
involves bundling has to be carefully scrutinized, as it
entails a trade-off between two forces that may have
opposite effects on social welfare.
In one of the most controversial cases, the US and
the EU severely disagreed on the proposed merger
between General Electric (GE) and Honeywell in
2001. Although the two parties were US-based multi-
nationals, the merger also fell under the European
Merger Control Regulation as their total turnover in
the EU amounted to 29 bn euros.1 The US Department
of Justice was broadly in favor, whereas the European
Commission decided to block the merger because of a
possible bundle between GE’s jet aircraft engines and
Honeywell’s avionics products.2 The Commission
also raised a second point of concern, which is of in-
terest for this paper: the practical difficulty for rival
suppliers of engines and avionics to respond appropri-
ately, for example by merging, or by forming selling
consortia, and then offering their own competing
bundle.3
Another interesting case is the merger between
Comcast and NBC Universal, which was approved
in 2011 by both the Federal Communication Commis-
sion and the Department of Justice. The approval
arrived under the condition that other providers main-
tained access to NBC programming and that Comcast
made available an affordable broadband without forc-
ing customers to subscribe to a cable bundle. This
*Correspondence to: Department of Economics, University of Bologna,
Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy. E-mail: a.mantovani@
unibo.it
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
Manage. Decis. Econ. (2014)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/mde.2685
decision triggered a lot of criticism as it was argued
that the merged entity would have charged rivals, such
as DirecTV or Verizon Fios, anticompetitive rates to
access Comcast/NBC programming. Moreover, be-
cause of the size of the parties involved, it was clear
that chances for rivals to create a direct competitor
by counter merging were extremely limited.4
Although both cases clearly illustrate that merging
and bundling can affect market competition in
different ways, the literature has so far mainly focused
on the market foreclosure effects of conglomerate
mergers that may or may not involve bundling.5 How-
ever, we believe that it is necessary to expand the
understanding of all the possible scenarios that could
follow the formation of a merger. In particular, how
would rivals respond, if they were allowed to coun-
ter-merge? Indeed, it could well be that rivals would
like to merge and bundle as well, but as the analysis
will show, this will not necessarily be the case. Thus,
the focus of our paper is not on foreclosure. Rather,
our aim is to shed more light on how the interplay
between merging and bundling decisions contributes
to shape the strategic interaction between players in
the market.
For that matter, we consider the firms of two pairs
of complementors (producers of complementary
products) that compete by setting prices. In the prelim-
inary stage of the game, each firm has to decide
whether to remain independent or to merge with its
complementor. If two complementors merge, they
can also opt to sell their two products in a package
or bundle. Moreover, as anecdotal evidence suggests
that mergers usually appear in sequence, we also in-
vestigate the case in which one pair of complementors
moves before the other.6
A good example of the interaction between merg-
ing and bundling decisions can be found in the
German energy market. After the approval of the
merger between the electricity provider E.ON and
the gas producer Ruhrgas in 2003, the so created E.
ON Ruhr engaged in bundling by offering bi-energy
bundles. Later in 2003, Cuxhaven (gas provider) and
SWB (electricity provider) also merged in order to
offer energy packages.7 Another example concerns
the almost simultaneous approval of two mergers in
the satellite navigation industry, respectively between
TeleAtlas and TomTom and between NAVTEQ and
Nokia.8 Clearly, both mergers were inspired by the
incentives for technological bundling.9
However, it is worth remarking that we abstract
from any type of synergy that may result from merg-
ing or bundling. Apart from the timing asymmetry in
the sequential game, there are no additional factors
that create an initial incentive to merge and/or to bun-
dle. Another crucial point of our model is that goods
are imperfect substitutes within the same market and
imperfect complements between the two markets. It
follows that complementary goods are valuable even
if consumed independently. Although strongly in-
spired by recent antitrust decisions, the predictions of
our model are therefore not only confined to the study
of composite systems that require both complements
to work together.
The main message of our paper is that the strategic
interaction between bundling and merging depends on
the level of competitive pressure in the market, which
is captured by the combination of the different degrees
of product complementarity and brand substitutability.
In particular,
(1) When competitive pressure is relatively weak
(sufficiently high degrees of product comple-
mentarity and/or brand differentiation), firms
within both pairs of complementors decide to
merge. When this happens, bundling becomes
ineffective.
(2) For intermediate levels of competitive pressure,
the timing of the game is vital. When the game
is simultaneous, the firms of both pairs bundle.
This may give rise to a prisoner’s dilemma, as
they would obtain higher profits by remaining
independent. In the sequential game, the strate-
gic interplay between bundling and merging
emerges in its true nature: the first-mover pair
decides to merge, but not to bundle. This oc-
curs to avoid a profit-harming counter merger
by the second-mover pair, whose firms remain
independent in the absence of bundling.
(3) When brands are perceived as highly substitut-
able, and/or product complementarity is very
low, first movers merge and bundle, whereas
second movers refrain from merging. Differ-
ently from the previous case, the latter pair
gains by remaining independent when the for-
mer pair opts for bundling. Co-opetition is at
work in this scenario.
The last results deserve particular attention, as they
indicate that an endogenous limit to the merger/bun-
dling proliferation may be imposed by the degree of
market competition. This may explain why we observe
the presence of many producers that prefer to remain in-
dependent when the market already accommodates a
sufficiently high number of (conglomerate) mergers.10
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From a social welfare perspective, the first best
occurs when both pairs of complementors merge. All
price externalities are internalized and society benefits
from consuming at the lowest prices. When only one
pair merges without bundling, price externalities are
only partially internalized and this represents the
second best result. Remarkably, the socially optimal
outcome can be obtained also in the presence of
bundling but only when the firms of both pairs decide
to merge. This neutralizes the potential negative effect
of bundling.
The worst case occurs when bundling by one
merged entity is not accompanied by a counter
merger. This leads to an overall surge in prices,
thereby reducing social welfare. The bundling pair,
by softening brand substitutability in the presence of
low product complementarity, allows rival firms to
charge higher prices, provided they remain indepen-
dent. This may represent an interesting case also for
the antitrust agency, as it highlights a peculiar (and
so far neglected) scenario in which firms strategically
decide not to merge in response to a bundle proposed
by the rival pair, even if they potentially could. Market
foreclosure is therefore not the only concern for social
welfare when it comes to evaluating the impact of
mergers with bundling in complementary markets.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides the literature review. Section 3 presents the
model. In Section 4, we solve both the simultaneous
game and the more realistic sequential game. In
Section 5, we discuss implications for social welfare
and provide policy indications. Section 6 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The practice of selling two or more goods together in a
bundle has been extensively analyzed in economic
literature. In their seminal contribution, Adams and
Yellen (1976) considered independent bundled prod-
ucts and find that bundling can be detrimental for soci-
ety as it induces a kind of price discrimination that
exploits consumer surplus. Lewbel (1985) extended
their paper to consider the cases where bundled prod-
ucts are either complements or substitutes, whereas
Telser (1979) showed that bundling increases the net
return for a monopolist that bundles complementary
goods. Anderson and Leruth (1993) also analyzed
bundling in a complementary-goods duopoly and
found conditions for which independent pricing is
the dominant strategy. Economides (1993), in a simi-
lar framework, showed that firms may end up adopting
mixed bundling, even if this generates a prisoner’s di-
lemma. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) built a model
with heterogeneous consumers and elastic demand,
in which consumers are allowed to buy from more
than one supplier. They found that the impact on so-
cial welfare of bundled discount crucially depends on
the combination between demand elasticity, consumer
heterogeneity, and shopping cost levels. Thanassoulis
(2007) pointed out that mixed bundling may favor
producers but reduce consumer surplus if buyers incur
firm specific costs.
In our paper, we also endogenize the decision to
merge between producers of complementary goods.11
Kamien and Zang (1990) first suggested a two-stage
game where the merger decision anticipated the quan-
tity competition stage. Gaudet and Salant (1992) ex-
tended their model to consider perfect complements
and price competition. They find that some socially
desirable mergers may fail to occur. In Fridolfsson
and Stennek (2005) the merger, although unprofitable,
may increase the stock exchange value of the firm. In
Anderson et al. (2010), a merger of complements is
profitable in a competitive scenario depending on the
shape of the demand function.
Recent theoretical contributions analyzed the inter-
action between bundling and merging in the presence
of complementary goods. Dalkir et al. (2002) consid-
ered a model of quality differentiation in which there
is a single quality leader in each market, with all the
other firms producing lower quality products. They
demonstrate that a merger between quality leaders
has a negative effect on social welfare as it drives
prices up and reduces the choice for consumers. How-
ever, they do not analyze the strategic interaction be-
tween the merging entity and independent producers,
which is the object of our paper. Among many others,
two papers with a direct reference to the GE/
Honeywell case were the ones by Evans and Salinger
(2002) and Choi (2008). Evans and Salinger (2002)
criticized the decision taken by European Commission
to prohibit the GE/Honeywell merger.12 However,
their paper was mostly related to the legal controversy
of the merger, and their economic theory did not allow
to capture all the different forces at work.13 Choi
(2008) examined mergers in complementary system
markets where the merging parties may engage in
(mixed) bundling. He adopted a demand specification
for composite systems, which relies on the assumption
of perfect complementarity between components. The
main result is that bundling may have both pro-
competitive and anticompetitive effects. Yet, in case of
market foreclosure, bundling reduces unambiguously
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social welfare, and the merger should then be
prohibited. Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2011)
extended Choi’s model to account for consumers who
derive utility from individual consumption of each of
the four brands.
Two papers are related to our idea that the bundling
and merging decision may be affected by the degree of
product substitutability. Beggs (1994) studied endoge-
nous merger formation between two groups of firms
where products within a group are complement and
those across groups are substitute. His model can be
also applied in situations where complementary pro-
ducers engage in pure bundling. He finds that two
complementors may refrain from merging in order to
avoid counter mergers by rival complementors that
would increase price competition. This occurs espe-
cially when market pressure is high. Venkatesh and
Kamakura (2003) analyzed the effect of the degree
of substitutability on bundling and optimal pricing.
They showed that there exists circumstances where a
decrease in the degree of substitutability favors the
incentive to bundle.
The combination of complementary components
into composite systems has been studied by Matutes
and Regibeau (1988 and 1992) and Economides
(1989), inter alii. They considered fully integrated
firms and show that they prefer compatibility over in-
compatibility. Farrell et al. (1998) demonstrated that
firms may prefer incompatibility with cost heterogene-
ity in presence of at least three different varieties of
each component. Denicolò (2000) analyzed compati-
bility and bundling choices when a generalist firm
offering both components competes against two spe-
cialist firms. He showed that incompatibility or pure
bundling may be profitable for the generalist firm
when one component is less differentiated than the
other. Mialon (2011) extended the standard differenti-
ated products model used in Matutes and Regibeau
(1992) to analyze firms’ decision between a merger
and a strategic alliance in bundling their product with
other complementary products.
Our paper is also related to the strategic incentives
to bundle in oligopoly models. Carbajo et al. (1990)
adopted a model with homogeneous goods in market
B and valuations for goods A and B that are perfectly
correlated and uniformly distributed across consumers
and demonstrate that bundling increases product dif-
ferentiation. When firms compete in prices, bundling
softens market competition and both firms gain; when
they compete in quantities, on the contrary, only the
bundling firm gains. In Martin (1999), a multiproduct
firm enjoys a monopoly position in one market and
faces competition in the other one. He pointed out that
bundling changes the substitution relationships be-
tween goods to the advantage of the multiproduct firm.
An alternative approach in which bundling is used
to segment the market and relax price competition
can be found in Chen (1997). In his model, two firms
already produce a homogeneous good and have to de-
cide whether to introduce a second good and create a
bundle. He found that bundling emerges as an equilib-
rium strategy for both firms given that it increases
product differentiation. Liao and Tauman (2002) fo-
cused on multiproduct firms that produce differenti-
ated systems, each consisting of two complementary
goods. They show that an equilibrium exists where
firms offer bundle discounts. Gans and King (2006)
modeled the interaction between four producers of
two goods and investigate the consequences of a bun-
dled discount to encourage customer loyalty. They
found that, even for unrelated products, a bundled dis-
count has the effect of tying customers to particular
product brands, thus improving the profitability of
the firms involved.
Last, but not least, our analysis is also related to the
literature on ‘Co-opetition’, initially developed by
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). One of the most
important results of our paper is that, when two
complementors bundle, all firms increase prices and
there exists an interval region where firms of the rival
pair enjoy a higher profit. Casadesus-Masanell et al.
(2008) contribute to this branch of research by present-
ing Intel and Microsoft as a motivating example of the
tension between cooperation and competition that char-
acterizes relationships between complementors.
3. THE MODEL
We consider four firms (A1, A2, B1, and B2), two com-
plementary markets (α and β), and four goods (α1, α2,
β1, and β2). Firms A1 and A2 operate in market α by pro-
ducing respectively α1 and α2, whereas firms B1 and B2
provide β1 and β2 in market β. Goods are imperfect sub-
stitutes within the same market and imperfect comple-
ments between the two markets. We use brands when
referring to substitutes and products when referring to
complements. It is assumed that any good α or β is valu-
able even if consumed alone and that any combination
of α and β is equally worthy.14
As the level of the demand intercept has no effect on
relative prices and quantities, we normalize it to 1. The
social welfare function that represents such consumer
preference takes the following form:
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U ¼ mþ qα1 þ qα2 þ qβ1 þ qβ2
! "
# 1
2
q2α1 þ q2α2 þ q2β1 þ q2β2
! "
(1)
#δ qα1qβ1 þ qα1qβ2 þ qα2qβ1 þ qα2qβ2
! "
#γ qα1qα2 þ qβ1qβ2
! "
;
where m is the amount of the numeraire good,
whose price is normalized to 1, qα1 and qα2 (respec-
tively qβ1 and qβ2 ) are the quantities of good α
(respectively β) produced by firm A1 and A2
(respectively B1 and B2). Parameter δ ∈ (#1, 0) mea-
sures the degree of complementarity between each
combination of α and β, whereas γ ∈ (0, 1) measures
the brand substitutability both between α1 and α2
and between β1 and β2. The implied demand func-
tions are:
qαi ¼
1# γð Þ 1þ γ# 2δð Þ # 1þ γ# 2δ2# $pαi
1# γð Þ 1þ γð Þ2 # 4δ2
h i
þ γ 1þ γð Þ # 2δ
2% &pαj þ δ 1# γð Þ∑2l¼1 pβl
1# γð Þ 1þ γð Þ2 # 4δ2
h i : (2)
qβi ¼
1# γð Þ 1þ γ# 2δð Þ # 1þ γ# 2δ2# $pβi
1# γð Þ 1þ γð Þ2 # 4δ2
h i
þ γ 1þ γð Þ # 2δ
2% &pβj þ δ 1# γð Þ∑2l¼1 pαl
1# γð Þ 1þ γð Þ2 # 4δ2
h i : (3)
with i, j= 1, 2, i≠ j.15
Lemma 1
Substitutability and complementarity relationships
are preserved in the direct demand system if γ >
1
2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1þ 8δ2
p
# 1
! "
≡
¯
γ.
Proof
see the Appendix.
As indicated by Lemma 1, the parameter space will
be restricted to the region γ ∈
¯
γ; 1
( )
. Regarding the
cost structure, we assume that the two goods are in-
dependent in production and that neither merging
nor bundling yield any type of cost synergy. More-
over, the unitary cost of producing a unit of each
good is supposed to be symmetric across firms and
equal to 0.
When the merged entity decides to sell the two
products together in a package, the bundle is called
αβl, l = 1, 2. Mixed bundling is not a viable option
in the present model, as the utility function that we
adopt does not allow to find a specific demand
function for the bundle when firms also sell the
products on a stand-alone basis.16 However, we
can consider a pure bundling strategy, where each
bundle consists of one unit of the α good and one
unit of the β good. When considering an endogenous
composition of the bundle, it is possible to demon-
strate that each bundle contains an equal number of
goods α and β.17
In order to obtain the demand functions, the follow-
ing relation between the number of bundles and the
quantities of the different products needs to be inserted
in the utility function (see Martin, 1999):
qαβl ¼ qαl ¼ qβl : (4)
For example, when complementors in pair 1 merge
and bundle, whereas those of pair 2 remain indepen-
dent, the social welfare function (1) becomes
U ¼ mþ 2qαβ1 þ qα2 þ qβ2
! "
# 1
2
2q2αβ1 þ q2α2 þ q2β2
! "
# δ qαβ1 þ qα2
! "
qαβ1 þ qβ2
! "h i
# γqαβ1 qα2 þ qβ2
! "
: (5)
The implied direct demand curves are as follows:
qαβ1 ¼
2 1# γð Þ # 1þ δð Þpαβ1 þ γþ δð Þ pα2 þ pβ2
! "
2 1# γð Þ 1þ γþ 2δð Þ ;
(6)
qα2 ¼
2 1# γð Þ 1# δð Þ # 2 1# δð Þ # γþ δð Þ2
h i
pα2
2 1þ γþ 2δð Þ 1# γð Þ 1# δð Þ
# γ γþ 2δð Þ # δ 2þ δð Þ½ 'pβ2 # 1# δð Þ γþ δð Þpαβ1
2 1þ γþ 2δð Þ 1# γð Þ 1# δð Þ :
(7)
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qβ2 ¼
2 1# γð Þ 1# δð Þ # 2 1# δð Þ # γþ δð Þ2
h i
pβ2
2 1þ γþ 2δð Þ 1# γð Þ 1# δð Þ
# γ γþ 2δð Þ # δ 2þ δð Þ½ 'pα2 # 1# δð Þ γþ δð Þpαβ1
2 1þ γþ 2δð Þ 1# γð Þ 1# δð Þ :
(8)
Finally, when complementors in both pairs merge
and bundle their products, the social welfare function
(1) writes
U ¼ mþ 2 qαβ1 þ qαβ2
! "
# q2αβ1 þ q2αβ2
! "
# δ qαβ1 þ qαβ2
! "2 # 2γqαβ1qαβ2 (9)
and direct demand curves are as follows:
qαβi ¼
2 1# γð Þ # 1þ δð Þpαβi þ γþ δð Þpαβj
2 1# γð Þ 1þ γþ 2δð Þ ;
i; j ¼ 1; 2; i≠j:
(10)
Notice that bundling affects the perceived substitut-
ability and complementarity relations. In particular,
Lemma 2
When at least one pair of complementors resorts to
bundling, the bundle itself and the two goods pro-
duced by rivals are perceived as substitutes (comple-
ments) when γ># δ (γ<# δ).
Proof
see the Appendix.
Thus, in the presence of at least one pair of
complementors that merge with bundling, it is the
relative strength of brand differentiation vis-à-vis
product complementarity that determines whether
the bundle and the rival goods (sold either individu-
ally or in a bundle) are perceived as substitutes or
complements by the representative consumer. When
γ># δ, for example, brands are not very differenti-
ated and/or product complementarity is low. The
bundle becomes a substitute either to the bundle pro-
posed by rivals or to their alternative stand-alone
products. The opposite holds, mutatis mutandis,
when γ<# δ. This will play a prominent role in
explaining the main results of this paper, as it will
be shown in the next section.
4. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Firms interact in the market stage by setting prices. In
the preliminary stage of the game, each firm belong-
ing to the two pairs 1 and 2 selects a strategy from
the set: {remaining independent (I), merging without
bundling (M), merging with bundling (B)}. The
simultaneous version of such a preliminary stage is
represented in Table 1, where the first (second) super-
script denotes the strategy selected by the firms of pair
1 (pair 2).
Notice that we use symmetry to simplify the nota-
tion. As an illustrative example, πMI1 ¼ πMIA1 ¼ πMIB1
indicates the profit that each firm in pair 1 obtains by
merging without bundling, when firms in pair 2
remain independent. Moreover, it is important to re-
mark, for the sake of comparability, that we consider
per firm profits.18
The game is solved backwards, and equilibrium
values for prices and profits are reported in Table 2.19
We include only cases II, MI, MM, BI, BM, and BB,
given that IB and MB are respectively symmetric to BI
and BM.
Let us first focus on the impact of a merger without
bundling on prices:20
Lemma 3
A merger between the two complementors in pair 1
• always reduces prices for the involved parties:
pMIα1 ¼ pMIβ1
! "
< pIIα1 ¼ pIIβ1
! "
and pMMα1 ¼ pMMβ1
! "
< pIMα1 ¼ pIMβ1
! "
:
• increases (reduces) prices of the rivals when γ<
δ (γ># δ):
pMIα2 > p
II
α2 and p
MM
α2 > p
IM
α2 when γ<# δ; pMIα2 < pIIα2
and pMMα2 < p
IM
α2 when γ># δ.
As already established in the literature, two merg-
ing complementors, say A1 and B1, end up lowering
prices as they internalize the positive externality that
Table 1. Payoff matrix
Pair 2
I M B
I πII1 π
II
2 π
IM
1 π
IM
2 π
IB
1 π
IB
2
Pair 1 M πMI1 π
MI
2 π
MM
1 π
MM
2 π
MB
1 π
MB
2
B πBI1 π
BI
2 π
BM
1 π
BM
2 π
BB
1 π
BB
2
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a price reduction of one product has on the demand of
the other. What is interesting is the reaction by A2 and
B2, which raise (reduce) prices when product
complementarity is stronger (weaker) than brand sub-
stitutability. Intuitively, when γ<# δ, goods α2 and
β2 are perceived as differentiated enough respectively
from α1 and β1, and sufficiently complementary re-
spectively to β1 and α1. This explains the nonaggres-
sive price response by A2 and B2.
More formally, from the reaction functions, it is
easy to see that A2, for example, would react with an
aggressive price cut to the decrease in the price of α1
and with an accommodating price increase to the price
decrease of β1. When γ<# δ, the latter effect out-
weighs the former and the price of α2 increases when
A1 and B1 merge. The opposite holds, mutatis
mutandis, when γ># δ.
Introducing bundling when only one pair of
complementors merges and bundles strongly affects
equilibrium prices.
Lemma 4
A merger with pure bundling between the two
complementors in pair 1 has the following effect on prices:
• pBIαβ1 < p
MI
α1 þ pMIβ1 < pIIα1 þ pIIβ1 when γ<# δ,
• pMIα1 þ pMIβ1 < pBIαβ1 < pIIα1 þ pIIβ1 when γ∈ #δ;eγð Þ ,
where #δ < eγ < 1 in δ ∈ (#1, 0).21
• pMIα1 þ pMIβ1 < pIIα1 þ pIIβ1 < pBIαβ1 when γ > eγ.
Independent rivals in pair 2 always increase their
price: pBIα2 ¼ pBIβ2 > max pIIα2 ¼ pIIβ2 ; pMIα2 ¼ pMIβ2
n o
:
Lemma 4 shows that (pure) bundling can enhance,
soften, or even reverse the price effect induced by a
conglomerate merger. When γ<# δ, product comple-
mentarity is stronger than brand substitutability. The
bundling pair decreases the price even more as com-
pared with the situation where they merged without
bundling, and rivals raise prices as they produce
goods that are perceived as complements to the bundle
(Lemma 2).
Of particular interest is the parametric region γ># δ,
where the price for the bundle overcomes the
sum of the prices of the two unbundled goods sold
by the merged entity. Bundling can therefore be
used to reduce the aggressive pricing effect that
derives from a merger between complementary
products. Rivals would respond by increasing their
prices as well, if they remained independent, not-
withstanding the fact that their products are
perceived as substitutes to the bundle (see again
Lemma 2).
In addition, when γ > eγ , the price for the
bundle becomes even higher than the sum of the
prices of the two independently produced goods.22
When the competitive pressure in the market is
very intense, bundling overturns the price exter-
nality induced by merging. This will have impor-
tant consequences not only for the equilibrium
analysis but also for social welfare, as it will be
shown in Section 5.
Finally, notice that the situation is very different
when both pairs of complementors decide to
merge:
Table 2. Market stage equilibrium prices and profits
Case Equilibrium prices Per firm equilibrium profits
II pIIαl ¼ pIIβl ¼ 1#γð Þ 2δ#γ#1ð Þ2δ#γð Þ 1#γð Þ#2 1#δ2ð Þ πIIl ¼
2δ2#γ#1ð Þ 1#γð Þ 2δ#γ#1ð Þ
2δþγþ1ð Þ 2δ# γð Þ 1# γð Þ # 2 1# δ2# $% &2
MI pMIa1 ¼ pMIβ1 ¼
1#γð Þ 2þγ 3þγð Þ#6δ2½ '
Ψ π
MI
1 ¼ 1#γð Þ 1þδð Þ 2þ γ 3þ γð Þ # 6δ
2% &2
Ψ 2 1þγþ2δð Þ
pMIa2 ¼ pMIβ2 ¼ 1#γð Þ 1þγ#2δð Þ 2þγþ3δð ÞΨ πMI2 ¼
1#γð Þ 1þγ#2δð Þ 1þγ#2δ2ð Þ 2þγþ3δð Þ2
Ψ 2 1þγþ2δð Þ
MM pMMαl ¼ pMMβl ¼ 1#γ2þδ#γ πMMl ¼ 1#γð Þ 1þδð Þ2δþγþ1ð Þ 2þ δ# γð Þ2
BI pBIαβ1 ¼ 1#γð Þ 4#γ γ#2þ4δð Þþδ 4#5δð Þ½ '2 2#γ γþ2δð Þþδ 3#δ#δ2ð Þ½ ' πBI1 ¼ 1#γð Þ 1þδð Þ 4# γ γ# 2þ 4δð Þ # δ 4# 5δð Þ½ '
2
16 1þγþ2δð Þ 2# γ γþ 2δð Þ þ δ 3# δ# δ2# $% &2
pBIα2 ¼ pBIβ2 ¼ 1#γð Þ 1#δð Þ 2þγþ3δð Þ2 2#γ γþ2δð Þþδ 3#δ#δ2ð Þ½ ' πBI2 ¼
1#γð Þ 1þδð Þ 2þγþ3δð Þ2 2 1þδð Þ# γþδð Þ2½ '
8 1þγþ2δð Þ 2# γ γþ 2δð Þ þ δ 3# δ# δ2# $% &2
BM pBMαβ1 ¼ 2 1#γð Þ2þδ#γ πBMl ¼ 1#γð Þ 1þδð Þ2δþγþ1ð Þ 2þ δ# γð Þ2
pBMα2 ¼ pBMβ2 ¼ 1#γ2þδ#γ
BB pBBαβl ¼ 2 1#γð Þ2þδ#γ π
BB
l ¼ 1#γð Þ 1þδð Þ1þ2δþγð Þ 2þ δ# γð Þ2
Ψ= 4# γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1# 6δ) + γ[4 + δ(4 + 5δ)] and l= 1, 2.
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Lemma 5
When both pairs merge, bundling has no effect on
prices and the price of a bundle is equal to the sum
of the stand-alone prices: pMMαl þ pMMβl ¼ pMBαl þ
pMBβl ¼ pBMαβl ¼ pBBαβl , l= 1, 2.
If complementors in both pairs 1 and 2 merge, we
start from a symmetric ‘coordinated’ position in which
firms charge the same prices and sell the same quan-
tity. If they decide to bundle, each pair would plug
in the package the same units of each product and
charge a price equal to the sum of the prices of each
individual product.
A formal discussion is provided in the Appendix,
where we show that both the sum of the prices of the
stand-alone products and the price of a bundle respond
in the same way to a change in prices charged by the
rival merged entity. Therefore, it comes as no surprise
that, when both pairs merge, bundling does not affect
equilibrium prices.
We now investigate how merging and bundling
affect equilibrium profits.
Lemma 6
Consider pair of complementors l, with l = 1, 2. It is
easy to demonstrate that:
i πMIl > π
II
l ⇔γ < γ
MI≃γMM ;
ii πBIl > π
MI
l ⇔γ > #δ;
iii πBIl > π
II
l in γ∈ γ ¯; 1ð Þ;
iv πMMl > π
IM
1 ≡πMI2 ⇔γ < γMM ;
v πMMl > π
II
l ⇔γ < γ
MM ;
vi πMBl ≡πBMl > πIB1 ≡πBI2 ≡γ < γMB≃eγ;
vii πMMl ¼ πBMl ¼ πBB1 ≡πBI2 in γ∈ γ; 1ð Þ:
In δ ∈ (#1, 0), the following ranking applies:
γ < #δ < δII < δMI≃δMM < δMB≃eγ < 1
As the analytical expressions of the previous
threshold values of γ are rather complicated, the para-
metric regions of interest are represented in Figure 1.
The dashed area in γ ∈ 0;
¯
γ
( )
has no economic mean-
ing, following Lemma 1. We can now interpret
Lemma 6. To begin with, consider the decision of
one pair of complementors when rivals remain inde-
pendent. As long as γ< γMI(≃γMM), they prefer to
merge as the price drop induced by the Cournot effect
is sufficiently compensated for by an increase in sales
(i). Furthermore, the merged entity benefits from
bundling when γ># δ (ii). In any case, they always
benefit from merging with bundling compared with
producing independently, provided that the other pair
refrains from merging (iii).
Let us consider now what happens when rivals
decide to merge. Our pair of complementors prefers
to merge as long as γ< γMM (iv). This is efficient only
when γ< γII, otherwise both pairs would enjoy higher
profits by remaining independent (v). When one pair
decides to merge and bundle, the other pair is better
off with merging when γ< γMB (vi). On the contrary,
remaining independent is the best response in
γ ∈ (γMB, 1). Lastly, when there are two conglomerate
mergers, the decision to bundle becomes irrelevant
as prices and profits remain unchanged, as we know
from Lemma 5 (vii).
4.1. The Simultaneous Game
Consider the preliminary stage of the game that is
represented in Table 1. Solving backwards and refer-
ring to Figure 1 for the relevant parametric regions,
we obtain the following:
Proposition 1
Depending on the interaction between product com-
plementarity and brand substitutability, the following
holds:
• When γ ∈ð
¯
γ;#δÞ; we have one Nash equilibrium
in (weakly) dominant strategies given by (M,
M), which is also Pareto efficient.
• When γ ∈ (#δ, γII), we have one Nash equilibrium
in (weakly) dominant strategies given by (B, B),
which is also Pareto efficient.
Figure 1. The relevant interval regions.
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• When γ ∈ (γII, γMB), the game is a prisoner’s di-
lemma as the unique Nash equilibrium (B, B) is
Pareto dominated by (I, I).
• When γ ∈ (γMB, 1), we have two Nash equilibria
given by (B, I) and (I, B).
Proof
see the Appendix.
The interpretation of the main results in Proposition
1 is based on Lemmata 2–6. From Lemma 6, merging
without bundling is the (weakly) dominant strategy
for each pair of complementors in γ ∈ð
¯
γ;#δÞ . If one
pair decides to merge, rivals find it convenient to coun-
ter merge, as by remaining independent theywould have to
respond by increasing prices (Lemma 3). The resulting
equilibrium is Pareto-optimal given that # δ< γII. The
competitive pressure in the market is mild; brands are still
sufficiently differentiated to not induce a very aggressive
price war when they both merge. Bundling is not an option
as it would push prices down (Lemma 4).
The picture changes in γ># δ, where the bundle is
perceived as a substitute for the brands produced by
rival complementors (Lemma 2). Absent bundling,
rivals would respond aggressively to a merger by low-
ering prices, as we know from Lemma 3. In this
region, pure bundling plays a fundamental role as
it can be used to soften price competition. We
know from Lemma 4 that the price for the bundle
overcomes the sum of the prices of the two unbundled
goods and this may convince rivals to increase their
prices as well.
In other words, bundling can be used to dampen
the negative effects of an increase in the competitive
pressure in the market. This occurs for relatively low
levels of both brand differentiation and product
complementarity. Consider, for example, the pair of
complementors 1 and notice that
∂πBI1
∂γ
**** **** < ∂πIIl∂γ
**** **** and ∂πBI1∂δ
**** **** < ∂πIIl∂δ
**** **** when γ > #δ:
(11)
Bundling therefore reduces the profit loss occurring
when brands differentiation tends to fade away (↑ γ)
and/or product complementarity diminishes (↓ δ). This
spells out the incentives for pair 1 to bundle when
rivals remain independent. But will they really remain
independent? The answer depends on the parametric
region that we consider. Recall that, especially when
γ > eγ≃γMB (Lemma 4), overall prices increase if they
do not merge. Therefore, the trade-off of the second pair
faces is the following: reactivating price competition via
merging and bundling, thereby recouping market
shares, or remaining independent and charging higher
prices but in a smaller portion of the market.
As we know from Lemma 6, for intermediate values
of brand substitutability and/or product complementar-
ity, that is when γ ∈ (#δ, γMB), merging with bundling
is the (weakly) dominant strategy for each pair of
complementors. Consequently, firms in pair 2 elect to
merge and bundle. This leads to a prisoner’s dilemma
in γ ∈ (γII, γMB), as both pairs would have obtained a
higher profit by remaining independent. The mergers
between TomTom and TeleAtlas and between Nokia
and NAVTEQ, discussed in Section 1 of our paper,
can be interpreted in this way.23
The picture changes for higher levels of competi-
tive pressure:
Corollary 1
In γ ∈ (γMB, 1), a pair of complementors voluntarily
refrain from merging when rivals merge and bundle.
When brands are almost homogeneous and/or
product complementary tends to fade away, only one
pair merges with bundling, whereas the other pair
continues to produce separately. The bundling pair
can increase prices without eliciting an aggressive
answer by rivals, which prefer to raise prices as well,
instead of exacerbating price competition through a
merger in a market where brands are almost homoge-
neous. These asymmetric equilibria can be interpreted
in terms of co-opetition and reveal that the merging-
bundling strategy adopted by one pair can generate a
positive externality on rivals, which voluntarily opt
to remain independent.
4.2. The sequential game
In this section, we consider the situation in which one
pair of complementors moves before the other in the pre-
liminary stage of game, which is represented in Figure 2.
We assume that pair 1 moves first. For notational pur-
poses, M/B indicates the strategy of the complementor
when it is indifferent between merging with bundling
and merging without bundling (Lemma 5).
By proceeding backwards and comparing the
appropriate equilibrium profits, we find that
Proposition 2
if one pair moves first, the following holds:
• when γ ∈ð
¯
γ; γMMÞ , both pairs of complementors
merge (with or without bundling) and the
resulting SPNE is (M/B, M/B);
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• when γ ∈ (γMM, γMB), the first mover opts for
merging without bundling, whereas the other
pair of complementors remains independent
and the SPNE is (M, I);
• when γ ∈ (γMB, 1), the first pair of complementors
merges and bundles, whereas rivals remain inde-
pendent; the SPNE is therefore given by (B, I).
Proof
see the Appendix.
We can still refer to Figure 1 to visualize the areas
of interest. The first and the third interval region do not
require further attention. As it has been carefully
explained before, when γ ∈ð
¯
γ; γMMÞ , the first pair
merges thereby inciting a merger between the second
pair. There is only one deviation with respect to the
previous case. As, in this region, remaining inde-
pendent is not a profitable option for either pair,
the decision to bundle has no effect on prices, as
known from Lemma 5. Therefore, as merging with
or without bundling entails the same profit level,
M/B is the strategy adopted by both pairs in the
subgame Nash equilibrium. As for γ ∈ (γMB, 1), first
movers can now merge and bundle, whereas rivals
prefer to remain independent to not instigate a
price war.
It is crucial to remind the reader that we investigate
the strategic reasons that explain the firm’s decision to
merge and then to bundle without taking into account
potential synergies. The counter merger and consequent
bundling practice by Cuxhaven and EWE in the
German energy market, as described in Section 1, was
mainly driven by the possibility of exploiting
technological complementarities. Indeed, without syn-
ergy effect, we would have expected those two firms
to remain independent, as the degree of market compe-
tition can be interpreted as high in such a market.
Let us now focus to the region γ ∈ (γMM, γMB),
which is also extremely important for the purpose
of our analysis, as it represents a situation
in which the strategic interplay between merging
and bundling emerges in its true nature. In
particular,
Corollary 2
In γ ∈ (γMM, γMB), first movers refrain from bundling to
not induce rivals to merge.
We already know that each pair of complementors
always prefers to merge with bundling when the
other pair remains independent. However, when
γ ∈ (γMM, γMB), if the first-mover pair 1 adopts bun-
dling, then the second-mover pair 2 would respond
by merging (with or without bundling) as well, thus
intensifying price competition.24 The alternative
for pair 1 is to merge without bundling, as this
strategy would induce complementors in 2 to re-
main independent. Comparing pBMαβ1 with p
MI
α1 þ pMIβ1
and considering Lemma 4, it can indeed be demon-
strated that
pBMαβ1 < p
MI
α1 þ pMIβ1 < pBIαβ1 in γ ∈ γMM ;eγ≃γMB# $: (12)
This confirms that pair 1 prefers to avoid an ag-
gressive response by pair α as this would bring the
price for the bundle down to a level that is lower
than the sum of the prices for the two unbundled
goods when it merges. This provides a valid support
to justify the result that πMI1 > π
BM
1 in γ ∈ (γ
MM, γMB),
as we know from Lemma 6. In other words, when
market pressure is intermediate, the first movers
merge but refrain from bundling in order to avoid
a profit-deteriorating counter merger by the second
pair of complementors.
Figure 2. The sequential preliminary stage of the game.
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5. WELFARE ANALYSIS AND POLICY
INDICATIONS
The bundling strategy, when adopted by only one
pair of complementors, may drive prices up, thus
reducing consumer surplus. This is especially true in
γ ∈ (γMB, 1), where both the bundling pair and the two
independent rivals increase their prices at equilibrium.
On the other hand, in such an interval, the bundling
strategy can be profitable not only for the bundling
pair but also for independent rivals. Bundling may
then increase producer surplus.
It follows that the potential effect of bundling on
social welfare, defined as the sum of consumer sur-
plus and firms’ profits, is at least ambiguous. By com-
paring social welfare for all different combinations of
strategies, we find that in the relevant parametric
region defined by Lemma 1,
Proposition 3
SWBB= SWMM= SWBM> SWMI>max{SWII,SWBI};
SWII> SWBI when γ> γSW, where
¯
γ < γSW < γMM
< γMB.
Proof
see the Appendix.
As we considered two different time sequences
that characterize the preliminary stage of the game, we
want to show how this can affect social welfare. In
Figure 3, we summarize the most important equilibrium
results and the respective parametric regions. The thresh-
old value γSW is not represented given that in γ< γMM
both pairs decide to merge, with or without bundling.
First of all, social welfare is at its highest when
both pairs merge. As already established, this is
because the overall price level decreases when
complementors internalize the price externality. In
addition, Lemma 5 confirms that bundling becomes
ineffective in the presence of two mergers. This
explains why SWBB = SWMM = SWBM. The potential
negative impact of bundling on welfare is thus
completely neutralized when both pairs of com-
plementors merge.
The equilibrium analysis reveals that the simulta-
neous game provides a large area in which social
welfare is maximized: γ ∈ð
¯
γ; γMBÞ.25 The sequential
game reproduces such a favorable result only in
γ∈ð
¯
γ; γMMÞ. However, in γ ∈ (γMM, γMB), as stated in
Proposition 2, the first-mover pair merges without
bundling, and rivals prefer to produce separately to
avoid price competition. From the welfare stand-
point, this implies a social welfare loss equal to
SWMM# SWMI, as only the second best solution is
reached.
On the contrary, social welfare is at its lowest
either when both pairs of complementors remain
independent, or when one pair engages in bundling,
and the other one remains independent. The latter
case deserves specific attention as it implies a delib-
erate decision made by two firms, which has a
negative impact on society. The price surge due to
bundling and the concomitant negative effect on
consumer surplus is not offset by a sufficient profit
gain for producers. It follows that a policy maker
should prohibit bundling when the other pair has
no incentive to merge as well. Notice that our theoret-
ical model leaves open the possibility for each pair of
complementors to merge. It is therefore a strategic
decision, and not a de facto imposition, to remain
independent.
Figure 3. (a) The simultaneous game and (b) the sequential game.
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This finding is very interesting and it may, at first
sight, even seem counterintuitive, given that it
involves a situation in which the merged firm bun-
dles two products that are considered as very similar
to those provided by two alternative producers (γ>
SW). A consumer who is interested only in good α
can still buy α2, whose characteristics are very sim-
ilar to those of α1. However, as gathered from
Lemma 4, bundling increases both the price of the
bundle and that of α2 when γ ∈ (γMB, 1), from which
consumers would unambiguously suffer.
One would be tempted to think that in our frame-
work, pure bundling, in the absence of cost synergies,
is always socially detrimental and should accordingly
be prohibited tout court. This is not entirely true.
Following our previous analysis, one can easily verify
that, without bundling, both in the simultaneous and
in the sequential game, the equilibrium would be
(I, I) in γ ∈ (γMM, 1). Although this reduces the welfare
loss in γ ∈ (γMB, 1), where (B, I) would be selected
otherwise, prohibiting bundling would generate a
welfare loss when γ ∈ (γMM, γMB), by not allowing to
reach first best (B, B) in the simultaneous game or
second best (M, I) in the sequential game.26
An additional thought can be drawn from our find-
ings: we assumed that rivals, once the first pair merges,
in response have the means to decide whether or not to
merge, and this option is costless. In the presence of a
costly, long, or simply very difficult counter-merging
process, the negative effect of bundling on social welfare
would be even more evident. The first merged entity,
when facing independent rivals without the capacity to
merge, would decide to bundle in the even larger para-
metric region, exhibited by (γ + δ)> 0. An example of
this, as described in Section 1, is the evident difficulty
for rivals to initiate a merger process and successfully
compete with a conglomerate such as Comcast/NBC.
Finally, recall that the demand function is derived
from a representative consumer’s utility function.
Under this framework, whenever market environ-
ment changes as a result of merger or bundling, there
is a perfect adjustment in the allocation of consump-
tions over the four different products by the represen-
tative consumer (or the social planner). In reality,
however, consumers do not coordinate their con-
sumptions with each other. Hence, (seemingly) wel-
fare-improving mergers or bundling can actually
harm consumers if merger or bundling distorts
consumption allocations across different types of con-
sumers. Thus, as for the antitrust implication, we are
underestimating the welfare losses that mergers and
bundling may generate.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
6.1. Discussion of the Results
The main differences between the previous contribu-
tions and our paper are as follows: (i) we did not con-
sider market foreclosure effects, as we intended to
focus on how bundling affects the profitability of
merging and the concomitant response by rival firms;
(ii) we allowed for different degrees of both product
complementarity and brand substitutability; (iii) we
considered a representative consumer who is not
forced to buy both products, as each of them is valu-
able even when consumed alone. It follows that our
analysis applies to both mergers that require different
components to be assembled together, such as the
GE/Honeywell case, and others which do not, such
as the Comcast/NBC Universal case.
Unfortunately, the price to pay for such a rich
model is that it gives rise to a demand structure that
makes mixed bundling irrelevant. Indeed, when ana-
lyzing mixed bundling, the price of the bundle equals
the sum of the prices of its two stand-alone products.27
A consumer who wants to buy the two products is then
indifferent between buying them as a bundle or sepa-
rately. Hence, we believe that not considering mixed
bundling does not alter the quality of our results. Our
findings bring to light the strategic interplay between
the incentives to merge and/or to bundle for two pairs
of complementors in the market, which was the
intended object of our paper. This is also the reason
why we decided to consider a symmetric decision
structure and to leave the issue of market foreclosure
apart. Nevertheless, using a different model and intro-
ducing mixed bundling to the generalist firm’s set of
strategies would provide additional insights on the op-
timal firm’s strategy.
Moreover, we have also ruled out the possibility for
firms to bundle products without merging, for example
through a strategic alliance. The reason for this is
again driven by our primary interest to look at how
merger decisions affect the strategic use of bundling.
A potential extension of our paper aimed at capturing
such strategic alliances certainly warrants attention.
Finally, we abstract from considering the effect of
bundling decisions on the R&D activity carried out
by firms. This is particularly important in many
sectors, such as the broadband telecommunications
sector, where the network digitalization allows firms
to provide a variety of retail services over a single
platform. The cost saving associated with such opera-
tion has stimulated the proliferation of many different
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offers, in particular double and triple bundled dis-
counts. This issue certainly deserves a separate analy-
sis beyond the scope of our paper.
6.2. Conclusion
Our paper contributed to two branches of the economic
literature, one focusing on the bundling strategy adopted
by multiproduct firm and the other focusing on the
merging activity carried out by producers of comple-
mentary products. In particular, we analyzed the strate-
gic effect of the merging and bundling decisions
adopted by two pairs of complementors that compete
in the market by setting prices. The strategic interaction
is shown to depend on the intensity of the market com-
petitive pressure, which is measured by the combined
effect of intramarket brand differentiation and inter-
market product complementarity. This represented the
most important novelty of our paper, as we considered
different degrees of complementarity and substituta-
bility relationships. Additionally, we analyzed both a
simultaneous and a sequential preliminary stage of the
game in which firms’ decision-making take place.
When competitive pressure is low, both pairs of
complementors merge and the bundling strategy
becomes ineffective. This holds independently of the
sequence of the game; hence, moving first does not
convey any advantage. Social welfare is at its highest,
as a double merger between complementors favors
consumers by lowering prices.
The most interesting results appear when market
pressure intensifies, that is when brands become more
substitutable and/or products less complementary.
When the competitive pressure is intermediate, the
strategic interplay between merging and bundling
emerges at its full force. In the sequential game, in
particular, first movers merge without engaging in
bundling in order to avoid a profit-harming merger
by second movers. In such a circumstance, bundling
has a welfare-improving effect, as both pairs would
remain independent without the possibility to sell the
two goods together in a package.
When market pressure is very strong, one pair of
complementors merges and bundles, whereas the other
pair remains independent. This reveals the existence of
a co-opetitive scenario in which the bundling strategy
adopted by one pair also favors the other pair, whose
complementors decide to remain independent. The
co-opetitive result rests on the fact that bundling
increases not only the price of the bundle but also that
of independent producers. This surge in prices results
in the lowest possible level of social welfare.
Accordingly, a merger leading to bundling should be
prohibited by the antitrust agency.
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NOTES
1. The turnovers of GE and Honeywell in the EU were
respectively 23 and 6 bn euros.
2. For a brief history of the ‘transatlantic’ divergence
between US and EU regarding the GE/Honeywell case,
see Morgan and McGuire (2004).
3. The GE/Honeywell controversy reflects the different
views embraced byAmerican and European regulators re-
garding bundling, with the former being more tolerant
than the latter, since the Chicago School dismissed any
form of leverage theory. In the European competition pol-
icy, on the contrary, bundling gained enormous promi-
nence in a number of recent cases, for example Tetra
Laval/Sidel, the already mentioned GE/Honeywell and
the recent Microsoft case in which the European Commis-
sion ordered the unbundling of the Windows Media
Player from Windows.
4. The merger between Comcast’s cable systems and NBC
Universal’s channels created a media giant as it combined
a major producer of TV and movies with the dominant
distributor of TV and movies in big media markets.
NBC Universal is now 51% owned by Comcast and
49% owned by GE.
5. After Whinston (1990), the entry-deterrence use of bun-
dling complementary goods has been investigated by
Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Carlton and Waldman
(2002), Nalebuff (2004), and Peitz (2008), inter alii.
6. Nilssen and Sorgard (1998), Fauli-Oller (2000),
Andrade et al. (2001), and Qiu and Zhou (2007), inter
alii, consider the determinants of merger waves.
7. Energy and telecommunications are good examples of
industries in which mergers recently appeared in waves.
For bundling and mergers in energy markets, see
Granier and Podesta (2010).
8. TomTom and Nokia produce portable navigation
devices, whereas TeleAtlas and NAVTEQ produce
digital maps.
9. More cases can be found in the telecommunication sector.
In the USA, SBC bought out AT&T in 2005 for 16 bn
dollars and took also its name. The same year, Verizon,
its main competitor, took over MCI for 8.4 bn dollars. In
this framework, one of the main objectives of the mergers
was the adoption of bundling strategy. In the EU, a similar
dynamics can be observed in the merger between France
BETWEEN BUNDLING AND MERGING IN COMPLEMENTARY MARKETS
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Manage. Decis. Econ. (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
Télécom and Wanadoo and in that between Deutsch
Telekom and T-Online2.
10. This point has been initially suggested by Beggs (1994),
who observed that in many shopping malls, merchants
preferred to remain independent instead of creating
hyperstores. Although integrating with other shops
would have increased the intramall demand that would
have also exacerbated intermall price competition. In
our paper, bundling can be used to soften the impact
of merging on intermall competition.
11. Salant et al. (1983) demonstrated that, when firms com-
pete à la Cournot, a merger can be carried out only if
more than 80% of the industry is involved in the merger.
An interesting result is that outsider firms benefit more
from the merger than participating firms (insiders). In
their paper, the merger activity is considered as exoge-
nous, and it does not produce any efficiency improve-
ment for the merged entity.
12. General Electric–Honeywell, Case M. 2220, decision of
03/07/01 (‘GE–Honeywell decision’).
13. They consider a simple model in which two complemen-
tary goods are provided by a monopolist and the other is
provided by two firms selling differentiated products.
14. Recent decisions taken by the antitrust agencies im-
peded the producer to bundle two complements that
are mutually dependent. This is particularly relevant
in high-tech sectors, such as computers (see the
Microsoft case).
15. Choi (2008) builds on Economides and Salop (1992) to
provide a demand system for four composite products that
are substitutes for one another. As anticipated in
Section 1, we explicitly consider different degrees of
both brand differentiation and product substitutability.
We prefer to not rewrite expressions (2) and (3) in
terms of a more simple notation as the main results of
our analysis will crucially depend on the combination
between δ and γ.
16. A formal demonstration is provided in the Appendix.
17. See Mantovani (2013) for a thorough discussion.
18. When firms within a pair merge and bundle, per firm
profit equals half of the profit of the merged entity. Side
payments are not considered.
19. In γ ∈ð
¯
γ; 1Þ (Lemma 1), the system is stable and equilib-
rium prices and profits are always positive.
20. Proofs of Lemmata 3–6 directly follow from comparing
the appropriate values of equilibrium prices and profits
that appear Table 2.
21. The explicit expression of eγ is not reported in the paper.
However, all the relevant threshold values of γ that
appear in this and in the next section will be graphically
represented. The precise algebraic values are available
upon request.
22. In the literature, a form of bundling in which the bundle
price is higher than the sum of the separate prices is
known as ‘premium bundling’ (since Cready, 1991).
23. Unprofitable mergers may also occur because firms
merge in order to preempt their partners from merging
with rivals, as shown in Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005).
24. For this and the following statements, see the demon-
stration of Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
25. However, in an infinitely repeated version of the game,
a standard folk theorem argument suggests that firms
may implicitly tend to collude and refrain from
bundling. This would imply a welfare loss as compared
with the outcome of the one-shot game, with both firms
merging and bundling.
26. See Figure A in the Appendix for a graphical represen-
tation of social welfare ranking.
27. See the Appendix for more details.
28. A hat refers to conditional prices.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Because of the symmetric structure of the system, it suffices
to verify that (i) ∂qαi∂pαi < 0, (ii)
∂qαi
∂pαj
> 0; and (iii) ∂qαi∂pβi ¼
∂qαi
∂pβj
< 0.
In the parametric region delimited by δ ∈ (#1,0) and
γ ∈ (0,1), we find that the binding condition derives from
∂qαi
∂pαj
> 0, which is satisfied when γ > 12
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1þ 8δ2
p
# 1
! "
:
No solution for mixed bundling
Assume that A1 and B1 merge and engage in mixed
bundling, whereas firms A2 and B2 remain indepen-
dent. Then, the number of units sold of good α1 equals
the number of bundles αβ1 plus the number of stand-
alone products αS1:
qα1 ¼ qαβ1 þ qαS1 :
Similarly, the number of units of β1 equals
qβ1 ¼ qαβ1 þ qβS1
Substituting into (1) and taking FOCs of the Lagrangian
£, we find that demand functions cannot be derived.
Notice that for example:
∂£
∂qαβ1
¼ 2# ðqαβ1 þ qαS1Þ # γðqα2 þ qβ2Þ
#δðqαS1 þ qβS1 þ qα2 þ qβ2Þ # 2 1þ δð Þqαβ1 # λpαβ1 ;
∂£
∂qα1
¼ 1# qαβ1 # qαS1 # γqα2 # δðqαβ1 þ qβS1 þ qβ2Þ # λpαS1 ;
∂£
∂qβ1
¼ 1# qαβ1 # qβS1 # γqβ2 # δðqαβ1 þ qαS1 þ qα2Þ # λpβS1 :
It follows that
∂£
∂qαβ1
# ∂£
∂qα1
þ ∂£
∂qβ1
 !
¼ #λ pαβ1 # pαS1 # pβS1
! "
;
which cannot give a solution. Take, for example,
inverse demand functions, which can be obtained
following FOCs on prices:
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pαβ1 ¼ 2# qαS1 # qβS1 # 2 1þ δð Þqαβ1 # γðqα2 þ qβ2Þ
#δðqαS1 þ qβS1 þ qα2 þ qβ2Þ;
pαS1 ¼ 1# qαβ1 # qαS1 # γqα2 # δðqαβ1 þ qβS1 þ qβ2Þ;
pβS1 ¼ 1# qαβ1 # qβS1 # γqβ2 # δðqαβ1 þ qαS1 þ qα2Þ;
pα2 ¼ 1# qα2 # γðqαS1 þ qαβ1Þ # δðqβS1 þ qαβ1 þ qβ2Þ;
pβ2 ¼ 1# qβ2 # γðqβS1 þ qαβ1Þ # δðqαS1 þ qαβ1 þ qα2Þ;
From the previous expression, it is clear that
pαβ1 ¼ pα1 þ pβ1
The demand for the bundle equals the sum of the
demands of stand-alone products. It is therefore not
possible to use such a demand system to find equilib-
rium prices.
Proof of Lemma 2
From (6) and (7), we find that
∂qαβ1
∂pα2
¼ ∂qαβ1
∂pβ2
¼ ∂qα2
∂pαβ1
¼ ∂qβ2
∂pαβ1
¼ γþ δ
2 1# γð Þ 1þ γþ 2δð Þ ;
similarly, from (10)
∂qαβi
∂pαβj
¼ γþ δ
2 1# γð Þ 1þ γþ 2δð Þ :
The two expressions are equivalent, and their
sign only depends on the numerator, which is
positive when γ + δ> 0 and negative otherwise.
Indeed, looking at the denominator, we know that 2
(1# γ)(1 + γ + 2δ)> 0⇔ γ> (#2δ# 1). Nonetheless,
¯
γ ¼ 12
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1þ 8δ2
p
# 1
! "
> #2δ# 1ð Þ, from which the
sign of 2(1# γ)(1 + γ+ 2δ) is always positive in γ >
¯
γ.
Reaction Functions in Case of Two Mergers
When both pairs of complementors merge but do not
bundle, the sum of the prices of firm AB1’s stand-alone
products can be expressed as a function of the prices
firm AB2’s stand-alone products
28:
RMMα1 p
MM
α2 ; p
MM
β2
! "
þ RMMβ1 pMMα2 ; pMMβ2
! "
¼ p^MMa1 þ p^MMβ1
¼
2 1# γð Þ þ γþ δð Þ pMMα2 þ pMMβ2
! "
2 1þ δð Þ :
When the first pair of complementors merges and bun-
dles, whereas the second merger refrains from bundling,
the following reaction function of firm AB1 prevails:
RBMαβ1 p
BM
α2 ; p
BM
β2
! "
¼ p^BMαβ1
¼
2 1# γð Þ þ γþ δð Þ pBMα2 þ pBMβ2
! "
2 1þ δð Þ
When both pairs of complementors merge and bundle,
AB1’s bundle price depends on its rival merger’s
bundle price as follows:
RBBαβ1 p
BB
αβ2
! "
¼ p^BBαβ2 ¼
2 1# γð Þ þ γþ δð Þ pBBαβ2
! "
2 1þ δð Þ
Finally, when the first pair only merges, whereas the
second pair merges and bundles, stand-alone prices
of firm AB1 react in the following way to price
changes in the price of the bundle of AB2:
RMBα1 p
MB
αβ2
! "
þ RMBβ1 pMBαβ2
! "
¼ p^MBa1 þ p^MBβ1
¼
2 1# γð Þ þ γþ δð Þ pMBαβ2
! "
2 1þ δð Þ
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider Lemma 6 and the parametric regions under
investigation:
¯
γ < #δ < γII < γMI≲γMM < γMB < 1:
(1) In γ ∈ð
¯
γ;#δÞ, merging without bundling (M) is
the dominant strategy for the pair of
complementors 1 given that πMI1 > π
BI
1 > π
II
1 ,
πMM1 ¼ πBM1 > πIM1 , and πMB1 ¼ πBB1 > πIB1 .
The same obviously holds for symmetric pair
2. Moreover, πMMl ¼ πBBl > πIIl . The unique
Nash equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strate-
gies is (M, M), which is also Pareto dominant.
(2) In γ ∈ (#δ, γII) bundling becomes the dominant
strategy as πBI1 > π
MI
1 > π
II
1
# $
and similarly for
pair 2. The Nash equilibrium in (weakly) dom-
inant strategies is (B, B), which is also Pareto
dominant as πBBl ¼ πMMl > πIIl :
(3) In γ ∈ (γII, γMI), the only difference with respect
to the previous case is that πMMl ¼ πBBl < πIIl .
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Bundling is still the dominant strategy for both
players, but the game is a prisoner’s dilemma
given that the Nash equilibrium (B, B) is Pareto
dominated by (I, I).
(4) The subinterval γ ∈ (γMI, γMM) is very small as
the two threshold values tend to coincide.
Now πIIl > π
MI
l , but this does not alter the pre-
vious dominance given that πBI1 > π
II
1 > π
MI
1 .
The unique Nash equilibrium is (B, B), and
the game is again a prisoner’s dilemma.
(5) In γ ∈ (γMM, γMB), it still holds that πBI1 > πII1 >
πMI1 , but now π
MM
1 ¼ πBM1 < πIM1 . Bundling is
not anymore the dominant strategy: if rival pair
2 opts for merging, complementors in 1 prefer
to remain independent. Consider (I, M): it is not
a Nash equilibrium, as rivals in pair 2 would re-
spond by bundling if complementors in 1
remained independent (by symmetry, πIB2 >
πII2 > π
IM
2 ). However, as π
MB
1 ¼ πBB1 > πIB1 , pair
1 still decides to bundle when pair 2 bundles. The
unique Nash equilibrium is again (B, B), which is
Pareto dominated by (I, I), as we already know.
(6) Finally, in γ ∈ (γMB, 1), we have πIB1 > πMB1 ¼
πBB1 (and obviously π
BI
2 > π
BM
2 ¼ πBB2 Þ and
πBI1 > π
II
1 > π
MI
1 (π
IB
2 > π
II
2 > π
IM
2 ). This proves
the existence of two Nash equilibria along the
secondary diagonal: (B, I) and (I, B). Thus, in
this region, we have a chicken game.
Considering that subintervals 3, 4, and 5 provide the
same outcome, we obtain the four relevant parametric
regions that are reported in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us proceed backwards and analyze the decision of
pair 2 in response to the strategy selected by pair 1.
We refer to Lemma 6 for profit comparisons.
(1) If complementors in 1 remain independent (I),
then those in 2 compare πII2 with π
IM
2 and π
IB
2 .
We gather from Table 2 the values of πII2 and,
by symmetry, πIM2 ¼ πMI1 and πIB2 ¼ πBI1 .
It follows that πIM2 > π
II
2⇔γ < γ
MI , πIB2 > π
II
2
always and πIB2 > π
IM
2 ⇔ γ># δ. Consider
ranking
¯
γ < #δ < γMI < 1. This, combined with
the previous profit comparisons, indicates that
firms in 2 respond by merging (M) in
γ ∈ð
¯
γ;#δÞ, whereas they merge and bundle (B)
in γ ∈ (#δ, 1).They obtain πIM2 in the former
parametric region and πIB2 in the latter one.
(2) If firms in 1 decide to merge (M), then those in
2 compare πMI2 with π
MM
2 ¼ πMB2 ¼ πBM2
# $
. We
know that πMM2 ¼ πMM2 > πMI2 ⇔ γ< γMM,
where γMM >
¯
γ . It follows that they opt for
merging (with or without bundling, hence M/
B) in γ∈ð
¯
γ; γMMÞ , obtaining πMM2 ¼ πMB2 ,
whereas they remain independent (I) in
γ ∈ (γMM, 1) and gain πMI2 .
(3) If firms in 1 merge and bundle (B), rivals in
pair 2 contrast πBI2 and π
BB
2 ¼ πBM2 . We easily
obtain that πMB1 ¼ πBB2 > πIB1 ≡πBI2 ⇔γ < γMB ,
where γMB >
¯
γ. Hence, players 2 merge (with
or without bundling, M/B) in γ ∈ð
¯
γ; γMMÞ and
gain πBBj ¼ πBMj , whereas they remain indepen-
dent (I) in γ ∈ (γMB, 1), where their profit is
given by πBI2 :
We can now consider the strategy adopted by firms in
pair 1, which anticipate the best response of those in
pair 2. The threshold values of interest are ranked as
follows:
¯
γ < #δ < γMM < γMB < 1:
(1) In γ ∈ð
¯
γ;#δÞ, second-mover pair 2 opts for M
when firms in pair 1 remain independent (I),
whereas it plays M/B otherwise. Therefore,
first-mover pair 1 compares πIM1 with π
BM
1 ¼
πMB1 ¼ πMM1 ¼ πBB1 . We know that πMM2 ¼
πMM2 > π
MI
2 ¼ πIM2 ⇔ γ< γMM, with # δ< γMM.
Player 1 decide to merge (with or without
bundling), and players 2 respond in the
same way. The subgame perfect equilibrium
is (M/B, M/B )
(2) In γ ∈ (#δ, γMM), the only difference is that
players 2 decide to bundle (B) if players 1 select
I, while they continue to play M/B otherwise.
Players 1 now confront πIB1 with π
BM
1 ¼ πMB1 ¼
πMM1 ¼ πBB1 . Again, πMM2 ¼ πMM1 > πBI2 ¼ πIB1
⇔ γ< γMB. Given that γMM< γMB, also in this re-
gion players 1 merge (with or without bundling)
and the same do players 2. The subgame perfect
equilibrium is the same as in region 1.
(3) In γ ∈ (γMM, γMB) pair 2 opts for the following:
(i) B when pair 1 plays I; (ii) I when 1 selects
M; (iii) M/B when 1 opts for B. The first-
mover pair 1 then comparesπIB1 ,π
MI
1 , andπ
BM
1 ¼
πBB1 , where π
MM
1 ¼ πBM1 > πIB1 , where πMM1 ¼
πBM1 > π
IB
1 ⇔ γ< γ
MB; moreover, πMI1 > π
MM
1
⇔ γ># δ. These results, combined with the
previous ranking of the threshold values of γ,
imply thatπMI1 > π
MM
1 ¼ πBM1 > πIB1 . Pair 1 opts
for merging without bundling, and in response,
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complementors in pair 2 remain independent.
The subgame perfect equilibrium is (M, I).
(4) In γ ∈ (γMB, 1), pair 2 continues to bundle (B)
when pair 1 selects I, whereas it decides to re-
main independent (I) when 1 opts for either M
or B. Players 1 now compares πIB1 , π
MI
1 , and
πBI1 . Algebraic calculations confirm that π
BI
1 >
πMI1 ⇔γ > #δ and πBI1 > πIB1 ⇔γ > #δ. As γMB
# δ, pair 1 chooses merging with bundling,
and rivals in pair 2 remain independent. The
subgame perfect equilibrium is (B, I).
Proof of Proposition 3
When both pairs of complementors remain indepen-
dent, consumer surplus is as follows:
CSII ¼ 2 1þ γ# 2δ
2# $2
1þ γþ 2δð Þ γ2 # γ 1þ 2δð Þ # 2 1# δ# δ2# $% &2
By summing up consumer surplus and the profit of
the four producers (Table 2), social welfare amounts to
the following:
SWII ¼ 2 1þ γ# 2δ
2# $ 3# 2γ2 # 2δ 2þ δð Þ þ γ 1þ 4δð Þ½ '
1þ γþ 2δð Þ γ2 # γ 1þ 2δð Þ # 2 1# δ# δ2# $% &2 :
When both merge without bundling, consumer surplus
and social welfare are respectively given by
CSMM ¼ 2 1þ δð Þ
2
1þ γþ 2δð Þ 2þ δ# γð Þ2 ;
SWMM ¼ 2 1þ δð Þ 3# 2γþ δð Þ
1þ γþ 2δð Þ 2þ δ# γð Þ2 :
In the asymmetric case where only one pair merges
(without bundling)
CSMI ¼ Γ
1þ γþ 2δð Þ 4# γ2 1þ γð Þ þ δ 2þ δð Þ 1# 6δð Þ þ γ 4þ δ 4þ 5δð Þ½ '+ ,2 ;
Γ ¼ 2 1þ γð Þ2 2þ γð Þ2 þ 2δ 1þ γð Þ2 2þ γð Þ 5þ γð Þ
#3δ2 1þ γð Þ 9þ 4# γð Þγ½ ' þ #δ3 97þ γ 145þ γ 43þ 3γð Þ½ 'f g
#2δ4 5þ γð Þ 1þ 5γð Þ þ 24δ5 þ 72δ6
SWMI ¼ Θ
1þ γþ 2δð Þ 4# γ2 1þ γð Þ þ δ 2þ δð Þ 1# 6δð Þ þ γ 4þ δ 4þ 5δð Þ½ '+ ,2
Θ ¼ 2 1þ γð Þ2 2þ γð Þ2 3# γð Þ þ 2δ 1þ γð Þ 2þ γð Þ 9þ γ 9# γ 5þ γð Þ½ 'f g
#δ2 1þ γð Þ 121# γ 36þ γ 45þ 4γð Þ½ 'f g
#δ3 197þ γ 193# γ 65þ 37γð Þ½ 'f gþþ2δ4 61# γ 86þ 11γð Þ½ '
þ24δ5 11# 5γð Þ þ 72δ6:
Now consider bundling: when one pair bundles,
whereas the other remains independent:
CSBI ¼ 1þ δð Þ(Δ
16 1þ γþ 2δð Þ 2# γ γþ 2δð Þ þ δ 3# δ# δ2# $% &2
Δ ¼ 32þ 3γ5 þ γ4 1þ 24δð Þ þ 2γ2 δ δ 56δ# 27ð Þ # 52½ ' # 8f g
þγ3 74δ2 # 20# 8δ# $þþδf112þ δð76þ δ δ 32δ# 55ð Þ # 80½ 'g
þγ 32# δ 2# δð Þ 87δ2 þ 78δ# 4# $% &;
SWBN ¼ 1þ δð Þ 2 1# γð Þϒ þ Δ½ '
16 1þ γþ 2δð Þ 2# γ γþ 2δð Þ þ δ 3# δ# δ2# $% &2
ϒ ¼ 4# γ γ# 2þ 4δð Þ # δ 4# 5δð Þ½ '2 þ 2 2þ γþ 3δð Þ2 2 1þ δð Þ # γþ δð Þ2
h in o
Finally, consumer surplus and total welfare in BM
and BB are the same as in MM, as we can infer from
Lemma 5. Hence,
CSBM ¼ CSBB ¼ CSMM ; SWBM ¼ SWBB ¼ SWMM :
It is possible to demonstrate that, in the admissible
interval region defined by Lemma 1,
SWBM ¼ SWBB ¼ SWMM > SWMI > SWII :
Now consider SWBI. We find that SWMI> SWBI and
SWII > SWBI⇔ γ > γSW :
Moreover,
¯
γ < γSW < γMM < γMB . Additional
calculations are available upon request. However, as
they imply algebraic expressions that have been
evaluated throughMathematica, we decided not to write
their explicit expression in the text. To help the reader,
however, we represent in Figure A the threshold value
γSW together with γMM.
Figure A. Social welfare ranking.
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